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How Do Environmental and Natural Resource Economics Texts Deal With the 
Simple Model of the Intertemporal Allocation of a Nonrenewable Resource? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Textbooks in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics invariably deal with the 
problem of allocating a non-renewable resource over time.  The simplest version of that 
problem is the case of a resource that is to be allocated over two periods.  The resource 
has a constant Marginal Extraction Cost (MEC).  Most textbooks treat this case before 
moving on to more complex and realistic cases.  This paper suggests the results that 
should be emphasized and the method that should be used to arrive at those results.  It 
also points out the possible confusions that should be avoided.  Finally, it examines how 
several well-known textbooks treat this issue. 
 
How Do Environmental and Natural Resource Economics Texts Deal With the 
Simple Model of the Intertemporal Allocation of a Nonrenewable Resource? 
 
 
 The efficient allocation of a non-renewable resource over time and the 
performance of competitive markets in allocating such a resource are fundamental to 
understanding the general role of markets in allocating natural resources and the concept 
of sustainability.  In most textbooks, the first look at this issue comes in the form of a 
simple example showing the efficient allocation of a non-renewable resource over two 
periods.  The demand for the resource is assumed to be the same in the two periods, the 
MEC is the same for all units, and the interest rate is assumed to be positive. 
 The example should derive the efficient time path of consumption by showing 
that it maximizes the sum of the present discounted values of consumption benefits minus 
extraction costs in the two periods.  If possible, it should do so without resorting to 
calculus, because many students in these courses have limited mathematics background.  
The example should illustrate the efficient time path of price and quantity using the 
concept of user cost (the notion that the amount of net benefit lost in period 1, if one 
additional unit is consumed in period 0, is the difference between the marginal benefit in 
period 1 and the MEC, adjusted for the time value of money).  Maximization of the PV of 
net consumer benefits requires that (MB0 (Q0) – MEC) = (MBB1(Q1) – MEC)/(1 + r), 
where Q0 + Q1 = QT, the total amount of the resource available. 
 Having derived the efficient time path, the discussion should then show that a 
competitive market (containing many independent resource owners possessing 
knowledge of the present and future extraction costs and demands) would arrive at the 
same outcome.  An easy way to obtain this result is to show that a wealth-maximizing 
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owner would decide when to extract and sell by comparing (P0– MEC) to (P1 – 
MEC)/(1+r).  If the former is greater than the latter, it would sell in period 0.  If the 
opposite is true, it would sell in period 1.  If they are equal, the firm would be indifferent 
as to when to extract and sell.  Since all sellers would want to sell in the period with the 
higher PV of (P – MEC), the only allocation that would result in some of the good being 
sold in each period is the allocation at which P0 – MEC = (P1 – MEC)/(1 + r).  This is 
essentially an arbitrage story.  Rational behavior by consumers guarantees that Pi = MBi, 
so the competitive market allocation is identical to the socially efficient allocation.  It 
may be useful to note in passing that the competitive equilibrium obeys the “Hotelling 
Rule,” which requires the difference between price and extraction cost to increase at the 
rate of interest over time in cases such as this one.  The goal of the analysis should be to 
explain in an accessible way (without calculus) what the efficient time paths of price and 
consumption look like and to show that a well-functioning competitive market duplicates 
this efficient outcome. 
 Having shown these things, one can move on to more complex stories, such as 
“backstop” technologies and non-constant marginal extraction costs.  This paper does not 
concern itself with these extensions.  Rather, I want to report and comment on how the 
leading texts dealing with natural resource economics issues handle the simple two-
period constant MEC case. 
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How Do the Leading Texts Handle This Problem? 
 It is perhaps surprising to learn that most of the texts I examined fall short of the 
ideal presentation of this concept in one or more ways.  In one case, the presentation 
contains so many errors that it fails in all the key areas. 
 One of the best treatments is found in a book on energy economics (Griffin and 
Steele, 1984).  Griffin and Steele begin by focusing on a firm that owns a non-renewable 
resource and working out the implications of wealth maximization.  In the course of their 
discussion (pp. 68-78), the authors explain the notion of user cost (or, as they prefer to 
call it, user value) without specifying what sort of firm is being discussed or how 
marginal revenues at various future dates are determined.  In that general setting, Griffin 
and Steele derive the rule that, given a set of expectations about future costs and 
demands, user cost (MRt –MECt) must rise at the rate of interest.  They also show that 
changes in expectations about either future demand or extraction costs can cause the time 
path of user costs to change.  Having thoroughly discussed user cost, they move on to 
Hotelling’s result, which, as they point out, is based on the assumption of a competitive 
market.  They do an excellent job of showing (in the two-period case) how the 
equilibrium reached in a competitive market consisting of many wealth-maximizing 
resource owners would result in the user cost’s rise at the rate of interest.  This 
presentation meets almost all the standards of a good presentation of this issue.  It gives a 
thorough introduction to user cost, shows that user cost must rise at the rate of interest for 
a resource owner who plans to sell some of the resource in all periods, derives the 
Hotelling result, and shows convincingly why a competitive market in equilibrium must 
display the Hotelling result.  In the course of showing the Hotelling result for a 
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competitive market, they introduce a diagram that finds its way, in one form or another, 
into many later textbooks.  This shows the derivation of the (P0 – MEC) = (P1 – 
MEC)/(1+r) condition by measuring Q0 from left to right and Q1 from right to left.  P1 – 
MEC is discounted, and the width of the diagram is QT = Q0 + Q1. The numerical 
example that lies behind the diagram is as follows:  Demand in each period is given by Pt 
= 50 – 0.5·Qt (t = 0,1).  MEC = 0.  The interest rate is r = 0.1.  Their diagram is 
reproduced here as Fig. 1. 
[Insert Fig. 1 here.] 
Griffin and Steele tell their entire story without calculus.  Only two important and related 
concepts are missing: a derivation of the socially efficient allocation of a non-renewable 
resource and the demonstration that the competitive equilibrium allocation is socially 
efficient. 
 Tom Tietenberg’s (2003) text treats this issue in three places and contains no 
serious errors.  However, he does rely on calculus to tell the basic intertemporal 
optimization story (pp. 33 and 101), and his discussion of the market allocation of the 
resource, focusing on the efficiency of the outcome, does not use wealth-maximization 
and arbitrage behavior by resource owners to show how the market equilibrium is arrived 
at.  His discussion is couched entirely in terms of what an efficient market would do:  “An 
efficient market would have to consider not only the marginal cost of extraction for this 
resource, but the marginal user cost as well.  Whereas in the absence of scarcity, the price 
would equal the marginal cost of extraction; with scarcity, the price would equal the sum 
of the marginal extraction cost and marginal user cost” (p. 92).  While Tietenberg 
correctly states the conditions that a competitive market would have to meet in order to 
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be efficient, he does not show how wealth-maximizing behavior of competitive resource 
owners moves the market to the efficient outcome.  The next authors considered do a 
much better job on that score. 
 Hartwick and Olewiler (1998) discuss this case at some length (pp. 274-283).  
They solve the problem using the method of Lagrange.  As mentioned above, it would be 
nice to tell the story without using calculus.  They commit one error in the description of 
their Lagrangian problem.  The maximand is stated as [B(q0) – C(q0)] + [B(q1) – 
C(q1)]/(1+r).  They go on to say, “B(ti) is the consumer surplus from the extracted 
mineral in period t (t = 0, 1).” (Emphasis added.)  In fact, in this problem, B should 
represent total benefit to consumers (the area under the demand curve), not consumer 
surplus.  This is the only error in an otherwise excellent treatment.  They obtain the 
“Hotelling Rule” directly as part of the solution to the intertemporal efficiency problem.  
They then show that, if prices followed that pattern, all owners would be indifferent as to 
when to extract. 
 Another very good (though brief) treatment is by Eban Goodstein (2008, 
Appendix 6A, pp. 112-115).  Goodstein manages, without using calculus, to show how a 
competitive market would allocate a non-renewable resource over two periods.  He gives 
a correct statement of the Hotelling result and (in a footnote) sketches why the 
competitive outcome is efficient.  I am not sure the discussion is long enough to give 
students a chance to understand it fully, but it is an impressive piece of concise writing. 
 A new book by Keohane and Olmstead (2007) presents a generally good 
explanation of the two-period model.  Without using calculus, the authors show the 
socially efficient allocation of the resource.  They point out that this allocation results in 
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MB –MEC growing at the rate of interest.  They use the Griffin-Steele diagram to show 
that the allocation is efficient. They do a great job of emphasizing the role of property 
rights in the story.  If the resource is not privately owned, those with access to it will not 
take account of the reduction in future scarcity rents that results from using an additional 
unit of the resource today.  When the resource is privately owned, a user today takes that 
foregone future net benefit into account.  They show that the prices implied by the 
efficient allocation they derived follow the Hotelling rule.  They then do a very good job 
of explaining why the competitive market equilibrium allocation of a non-renewable 
resource must generate user costs (or scarcity rents) that grow at the rate of interest. 
 It is, overall, a very good treatment.  My concern about Keohane and Olmstead’s 
presentation is how they switch between discussing a single owner’s resource and 
explaining how a competitive market would allocate resources.  They start with the case 
of a single resource owner (“Suppose we own an oil well…” (p. 87)).  They seem to 
assume that this well represents all of the resource, because their discussion of the 
efficient allocation of the resource over time explicitly assumes that selling more today 
lowers today’s price and raises the price in the future.  This is confusing, because it may 
lead the reader to wonder if the owner will take advantage of the market power that the 
example implies.  The early discussion is all in terms of efficiency, raising the question of 
whether efficiency will conflict with wealth maximization.  As the discussion moves to 
the Hotelling rule, the authors switch from a situation in which “we own an oil well” (for 
which we are trying to determine the efficient intertemporal allocation—and the amount 
withdrawn in any period affects the price in that period) to the intertemporal allocation of 
a non-renewable resource that is owned by many competing entities.  In that setting, of 
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course, no resource owner has any impact on the price of the resource in any time period.  
Having stated, in words, the Hotelling result and having explained why a competitive 
market will give that result, K&O “test” the theory by plugging in the values they arrived 
at for the original (“we own an oil well”) story and show that the Marginal User Cost 
does indeed grow at the rate of interest when oil is extracted at the optimal rate over time.  
But the allocation for the oil well was not arrived at by assuming wealth-maximizing 
competitive owners.  In fact, wealth-maximizing behavior by the owner of the original oil 
well would give a different (inefficient) time path of extraction.  I believe a careful reader 
of K&O’s treatment might come away confused by this story.  All confusion would be 
eliminated if the original story were changed so that it was clear that the problem was to 
allocate society’s stock of the resource over time, not an individual owner’s stock of the 
resource.  Then, when the Hotelling story is “tested,” it would be clear that we are 
thereby showing the equivalence of the efficient allocation and the Hotelling allocation of 
the nation’s resource.    
 While most of the texts discussed thus fell short of the ideal in some aspect of 
their presentation of the two-period non-renewable resource story (one didn’t explain 
how a market would be led to the efficient outcome, several relied on calculus, one didn’t 
show that the market outcome was efficient, one seems to suggest that a single resource 
owner faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its resource and must take into 
account how its time path of withdrawals would affect prices in different periods), they 
all got it mostly right.  The same cannot be said for the final book considered, by James 
R. Kahn (2005).  Kahn treats this subject in a two-page appendix that employs calculus.  
The appendix purports to find the dynamically efficient allocation of an exhaustible 
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resource (p. 41).  However, the mathematical equation Kahn employs to find this 
allocation is structured to locate the allocation that maximizes the PV of revenue (he 
assumes a zero MEC) for a firm that faces a downward-sloping demand curve in each 
period.  He assumes the demand equation in each period is pt = 500 - .5qt.  The discount 
rate is 5%.  There 100 units of the resource.  His equation is 
PV = (500 - .5q1)q1 + [476.2 - .4762(100 – q1)](100 – q1) 
The first term is revenue in period 1 as a function of the amount sold in period 1.  The 
second is the Present Discounted Value of revenue in period 2 as a function of the 
amount sold in period 2, where the amount sold in period 2 is 100 minus the amount sold 
in period 1.  He maximizes this PV expression by taking the derivative with respect to q1 
and setting it equal to zero.  The solution values for q1 and q2 are 60.97 and 39.02, 
respectively, implying prices in the two periods of 469.5 and 480.5, respectively.  His 
arithmetic is correct, but he has solved for the monopoly allocation, not the socially 
efficient allocation.  His formulation of the problem takes into account the effect that 
changing the amount extracted has on the prices in the two periods.  This would be the 
correct way to set up the problem for a wealth-maximizing monopolist, but Kahn claims 
not to be doing this.  The beginning of the appendix explicitly states that he is trying to 
determine the efficient allocation. 
 Kahn continues his discussion by attempting to illustrate the solution using the 
Griffin-Steele diagram.  As explained above, that diagram (for the zero MEC case that 
Kahn treats) locates the optimal allocation by finding the intersection of D1 and the PV of 
D2, where the PV of D2 runs from right to left.  This apparatus does indeed illustrate the 
efficient intertemporal allocation of the resource, but the answer it arrives at differs from 
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Kahn’s answer, since Kahn mis-specifies the problem.  Recall that a useful feature of this 
apparatus is that the intersection represents an allocation where the two quantities add up 
to the total amount available, and the PV of (P2 – MEC) = P1 – MEC.  In Kahn’s case, 
since he assumes that MEC = 0, this reduces to PV of P2 = P1, or P2 = (1+r)*P1 = 
1.05P1—the Hotelling result.  (The quantities would be 73.17 and 26.83, respectively, 
and the prices would be $463.41 and $486.59, respectively.)  But the prices Kahn derived 
do not meet this condition.  P2 is only 1.023 times as high as P1.  This should not be 
surprising.  A wealth-maximizing monopolist would allocate the resource so that MR2 – 
MEC = (1+r)*(MR1 – MEC).  In Kahn’s example, MRt = 500 – qt.  Thus, MR1 = 439.03, 
MR2 = 460.98, and MR2 = (1+.05)*MR1.  
 Kahn’s presentation of the problem of allocating a non-renewable resource over 
time falls short in all areas.  As noted, Kahn mis-states the problem and derives the 
wealth-maximizing solution for a monopolist, rather than the socially efficient allocation.  
Since he does not derive the efficient allocation, he is unable to show that the solution he 
obtains maximizes the present value of the sum of net benefits over time.  He does not 
introduce the concept of user cost, so he is unable to show the role of user cost in 
determining the efficient time path of consumption and prices.  He does not discuss the 
competitive equilibrium solution to the problem, let alone show that the competitive 
equilibrium is efficient.  (On p. 42, he refers to “the owners of the coal” but then proceeds 
through his example to treat the industry as a monopoly or perfect cartel.)  He does not 
mention the Hotelling rule.  He uses calculus.  While the use of calculus to discuss the 
problem at hand is not a fatal flaw—several good presentations used it—in Kahn’s case, 
it may have blinded him to his error in setting up the problem.  He could have obtained 
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the correct result if he had set up his problem as maximizing the present value of 
consumer benefits (net of extraction costs).  TBt would equal 500qt - .25qt2.  Had he used 
this, instead of the expressions for pt, he would have obtained the standard result.  The 
very fact that the egregious errors in Kahn’s treatment (which appears in an appendix) 
have survived two editions is evidence that the topic is not being covered by most 
adopters of Kahn’s text.  This should serve as a warning to authors to put the discussion 
of this topic in the body of a chapter and to avoid the use of calculus, if possible. 
  
Concluding Comments 
 Being able to explain the two-period intertemporal allocation problem for the 
simple case of constant MEC and unchanging demands should be a goal of every student 
in a course on natural resource economics.  While most of the texts reviewed fell short of 
the ideal presentation in one way or another, all but one gave a satisfactory treatment.  
That one, the text by James R. Kahn, did not meet any of the goals of a good presentation 
of this topic.  Users of this text should be warned to skip the appendix that discusses this 
topic and to devise another way to present the economics of a nonrenewable resource. 
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P0 P1 
$50.00 $50.00 
D1
$45.45 
D0 
P1c = $39.50 
P1c/1.1 = $35.90 
U0
P0c = $35.90 
U1 
U1/1.1 
 0 
60 
Q0 Æ 31.8 
28.2 
60 
 0 Å Q1 
Fig. 1.  Solution of the Hotelling price path and production rates (Griffin and 
Steele, p. 76). 
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